Presign

An admin, upgrade, token or config authority goes to an address that is not the multisig, one of its vaults, a member, or the multisig's own Presign Guard.

A Squads create, approve or execute instruction is signed inside a durable-nonce transaction: the signature never expires.

A create, approve or execute of this proposal already on chain landed inside a durable-nonce transaction: it may have been signed days or weeks before (the Drift takeover pattern).

A single key becomes the multisig's config authority and could change members and threshold without a vote.

The proposal changes the approval threshold.

An authority goes to one member's key, which can then act without a vote.

An authority is removed permanently.

A program's code is replaced.

A program or program buffer is closed.

An account is reassigned to another owner program.

An instruction named like an authority change (from the program's IDL) whose new holder cannot be identified.

The proposal's contents could not be loaded or decoded; it can never be reported as no risk.

The proposal changes the time lock.

The proposal can execute the moment its threshold is reached.

Fewer than half of the voting members can pass it.

An administrative instruction (pause, fees, oracle, config…), or a call the vault signs as a program's admin.

The simulated execution moves assets out of the vault.

The vault transaction requires a signature the multisig cannot provide.

A config authority can change the multisig without a vote.

Your approval is the one that makes the proposal executable.

A member is added.

A member is removed.

Members may spend without a vote up to a limit.

An authority goes to a Presign Guard whose proposer is this multisig's vault: still controlled, now delayed and vetoable.

An authority moves between addresses the multisig controls.

Some instructions could not be decoded (for example a program without a public IDL).

The rent collector changes or a spending limit is removed.

Transaction rules (drains, approvals, owner changes…) applied to the vault's simulated execution.

One signature is enough: a single member, or threshold 1 with several voters.

A config authority can change members, threshold and time lock without a vote.

A minority of voting members can pass any proposal.

Approved proposals execute immediately.

No member has the Execute permission.

The buffer with the new code could not be read.

The new code is not a build the registry verified for this program.

The new code is exactly a verified build (source repository and commit shown).

A scheduled change of the guard's own configuration weakens it — the first thing an attacker holding the proposer would schedule.

Part of a scheduled action could not be decoded.

A privileged action scheduled through a guard whose delay and veto were verified on-chain; unchanged severity when the guard cannot be verified.

The delay has passed: anyone can execute the action now.

The guard's delay is under one hour.

Only one guardian can veto.

The guard account could not be loaded, so its delay and guardians are unknown.

A scheduled configuration change that weakens nothing (adds guardians, lengthens the delay).

The proposal schedules actions through Presign Guard.

The action is waiting and can still be vetoed.

The proposer is also a guardian.

A rule of the supplied team policy is broken.

A rule could not be checked: contents not decoded, not simulated, or an account not loaded.

Your wallet account is assigned to another program.

Your token account gets a new owner.

A delegate may spend an unlimited amount of your tokens.

Nearly all of your SOL leaves the wallet.

Several different tokens leave your wallet at once — a typical drainer pattern.

A program's upgrade authority changes.

A delegate may spend your tokens.

More SOL leaves than the visible transfer instructions explain.

Tokens leave through a program call that is not a visible transfer.

Your entire balance of a token moves.

A close authority is transferred.

A nonce account's authority is transferred.

An account is closed and its rent goes to someone else.

Token-2022 CPI Guard is disabled in the same transaction as an unverified program.

SOL is sent to a destination.

Tokens are sent or burned.

A mint or freeze authority changes.

The transaction uses a durable nonce and does not expire with its blockhash.

Token-2022 CPI Guard is disabled.

A memo contains a link with phishing traits (links are always shown defanged).

An unverified program is called.

The simulation fails; balance changes cannot be observed.

SOL goes into new accounts as their rent-exempt deposit.

A confidential transfer hides amounts.

The priority fee (compute unit price × limit) the wallet pays is inflated — a drain that looks like a fee.

The withdraw authority of a stake account held by the wallet moves to another address (staked SOL is not in the wallet balance).

The stake authority of a stake account held by the wallet moves to another address.

SOL is withdrawn from a stake account the wallet controls to another address.

The lockup of a stake account the wallet controls changes.

A compressed NFT (Bubblegum) owned or delegated to the wallet is transferred to another address — invisible to token-balance simulation.

Two or more compressed NFTs leave the wallet in one transaction.

Another address becomes the delegate of a compressed NFT the wallet owns.

A compressed NFT the wallet owns is burned.

A Bubblegum v2 transfer / delegate / burn involves the wallet; identified, but its recipient is not decoded.

A Metaplex Core instruction involves the wallet: NFT ownership changes are not token balances and are not decoded.

The wallet, as upgrade authority, replaces a program's code.

The wallet, as authority, closes a program or buffer permanently.

The wallet account itself would get data space and may become unusable.

Tokens are minted with the wallet's mint authority to an account it does not own.

A never-expiring (durable nonce) signature calls an unverified program: it can run later, when behavior may differ from today's simulation.

An unverified program gets the wallet's signature and write access to its token accounts but does nothing visible in the simulation — the pattern of drainers that detect simulations.

Other transactions changed your SOL balance during the simulation; only outflow they cannot explain is treated as unexpected.

Other transactions changed your token balance during the simulation; only outflow they cannot explain is treated as unexpected.

The bytes presented as a message are a valid Solana transaction message; signing them can authorize that transaction.

The message contains zero-width or direction-changing characters that hide or reorder text.

The message mentions a seed phrase, recovery phrase or private key.

The message names a different website than the origin Presign verified for the request.

A link in the message matches phishing patterns.

The message uses transfer, approval or permission language the requesting service may treat as your authorization.

The message contains wording aimed at manipulating automated reviewers.

The message contains a long encoded block (100+ characters of hex / base58 / base64) — a key, signature or payload the signer cannot read; the evidence notes when it decodes as a Solana transaction.

A sign-in message has no one-time nonce or no timestamp, so the signature could be reused.

The connecting application's address matches a phishing pattern (look-alike brand, punycode, shortener, raw IP, suspicious TLD, hidden characters, disguised destination…); an unknown domain is reported as unknown, never safe.

The connecting application uses plain http (outside local development).

The simulation moves more SOL out of the wallet than the requesting application declared (network fee excluded).

The simulation moves more of a token out of the wallet than the application declared.

The simulation moves a token out of the wallet that the application did not declare at all.

(suffixed :<mint>) A token the simulation credits to the wallet has HIGH/CRITICAL token findings (freeze authority, permanent delegate, paused, default-frozen, RugCheck rugged…): a honeypot swap. A failed scan makes the analysis PARTIAL.

(suffixed :<address>) The wallet pays an address directly whose only earlier contact with it was unsolicited dust (≤ 0.001 SOL / 0.01 tokens, never signed by the wallet): the address-poisoning pattern. Checks the last 1,000 transactions; a failed lookup makes the analysis PARTIAL.

The application's name claims a well-known brand (Phantom, Jupiter, Solflare…) but its domain is not one of that brand's known domains.

The connecting application's address is not a valid https:// URL; the connection request is refused.

The connecting application runs on this computer (localhost) over plain http.